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A “GREEN” APPROACH TO HEDGE FUND REGULATION
AND REFORM
MATTHEW KEEHN*
INTRODUCTION
The green energy revolution has always lacked one thing: money.
At its beginning, it was thought of as an idealist, hippie movement that
would never be able to stand up to traditional forms of energy. A 2011 blog
post for the Huffington Post sums up the general consensus succinctly,
in a discussion on personal sustainability, saying “[T]he government won’t
do it for you. The banking industry has proven they don’t want to do it for
you.”1 The blog writer also offers up an American Indian proverb to his
readers: “Only when the last tree has died, and the last river has been
poisoned, and the last fish has been caught, will we realize that we cannot
eat money.”2 However, not all hope is lost for sustainable energy solu-
tions in the United States. Nor is the financial services sector quite the
big bad wolf that this blog author makes it out to be. The government is
pulling for green energy.3 Financial markets are betting on green energy.4
Despite this, traditional forms of energy are still the norm in the United
States, and renewable energy has yet to capture significant market share
from traditional forms. While the country has taken significant steps
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2017; B.A. Engineering Studies, minor in
Classics, Lafayette College, 2012, cum laude. The author would like to thank the staff of
the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review for their efforts on this Note,
as well as his family and friends for their constant support and encouragement.
1 Jerry Nelson, We Can’t Eat Money, THE HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (Dec. 19, 2011, 6:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jerry-nelson/we-cant-eat-money_b_1156252.html [https://
perma.cc/U37E-JC8K].
2 Id.
3 See Budget Formulation and Execution, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENERGY
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://energy.gov/eere/budget/budget-formulation
-and-execution [https://perma.cc/W4VA-4XAQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (outlining the
process of the EERE, a sub-office of the Department of Energy, submitting a planned
budget to Congress for approval and subsequent evaluation of that budget).
4 See Peter C. Fusaro, The New Green Business Model For Investment, FORBES CUSTOM
(2008), http://www.forbescustom.com/EnvironmentPgs/NewGreenBusinessModelP1.html
[https://perma.cc/37C2-ARZM] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (discussing the emerging market
for hedge funds that invest in green energy, the status of such funds in 2008, and how
the green hedge fund has become a new asset class for investors).
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toward sustainability, traditional energy still has much more capital
funding than sustainable forms of energy in the marketplace.
That leaves environmentalists with a question: where can we find
the capital for sustainable energy? To answer this question, we must first
take a step back, and ascertain how capital enters the marketplace. Firms
in the marketplace generate capital by selling financial instruments to
investors, who give the firms cash in return for some share in the future
value of the firm.5 This cash, or capital, that investors contribute to the
market is instrumental in the growth of any firm.6 Capturing a greater
market share (the percentage of an industry’s sales that go to a particu-
lar company) requires large amounts of capital.7 This is particularly true
in an established market, like the energy sector.8 This explains why the
sustainable energy sector, even though it is getting some funding, will
not be able to capture significant market share from traditional energy
without significant capital investment. One possible solution is to get
hedge funds to invest more in the sustainable energy sector.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) recently reshaped hedge fund regulations,9
and the new rules are unnecessarily stringent. Regulations increase the
cost of running the business of a hedge fund, and therefore the capital
provided by those funds becomes more expensive for the borrowers who
receive large capital investments10 (to make up for the increased expenses
on the fund-side). The market as a whole—corporations and investors
alike—would benefit from cheaper capital if the regulations were moved
back to pre-Dodd-Frank standards. In order to prove this hypothesis, the
SEC should allow a subset of hedge funds to operate on pre-Dodd-Frank
regulatory standards, and evaluate those funds as compared to remain-
ing hedge funds operating under Dodd-Frank regulations. The perfor-
mance of pre-Dodd-Frank funds will surpass that of Dodd-Frank funds,
and fraud will not be an issue. In response to this the SEC would be able
5 See Capital Markets, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalmarkets
.asp [https://perma.cc/LH6T-NSSB] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (defining capital markets
basic structure and components).
6 Id.
7 Market Share, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/marketshare.asp
[https://perma.cc/3RMR-GQ8W] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
8 Id.
9 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
10 See PHILIP COGGAN, GUIDE TO HEDGE FUNDS 82–83 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2d ed.
2011) (discussing the effect of hedge funds on the overall financial markets).
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to remove the Dodd-Frank restrictions on hedge funds (for good cause)
and cut a costly administration task from its budget. The question then
remains: which subset of hedge funds should operate as this subset?
The answer is also the answer to the capital investment problem
in the renewable energy sector. Allowing “green” hedge funds to operate
on pre-Dodd-Frank regulations would bring some of the necessary capital
into the sustainable sector of the energy market. This influx of cheap
capital into the green energy firms will facilitate expansion and capture
a greater portion of the overall energy space from traditional, fossil fuel
based forms of energy.11 An additional impact of this influx of capital is
that the federal government can decrease the funding it is currently pour-
ing into sustainable energy. Although the private sector currently funds
a substantial portion of sustainable energy efforts, the government still
distributes significant funds into this particular market.12 The result of
allowing funds to go pre-Dodd-Frank is a win-win scenario. Hedge fund
regulation is amended to an optimal point for both protection and market
operations. In addition, sustainable energy is a more viable product for a
larger portion of the American population, thus reducing our national
contribution to global climate change.
Hedge fund regulation ramped up after the 2008 Financial Crisis
in the form of Dodd-Frank.13 While there were concerns about the regula-
tion of hedge funds after the credit crunch and economic woes of 2008,
these funds were not as substantial contributors as once thought.14 As our
economy is in constant motion and contains enormous amounts of moving
parts, it is difficult to evaluate the current status of markets and their regu-
lations. There are always new factors that were not present in the past,
which may or may not skew the analysis. Due to this fluctuation, it is diffi-
cult to test the effectiveness of new regulations as they happen. We can
only look back into the past, and evaluate the regulations in hindsight.
11 See Rich Anderson, Ready, Set, Grow: Using Capital to Invest in Your Company’s Growth,
MOSS ADAMS LLP INSIGHTS, http://www.mossadams.com/articles/2015/February/raising
-capital-for-growth [https://perma.cc/VXA9-65EQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
12 See Ron Flavin, The US Department of Energy’s 2014 Budget Request: Implications for
Renewable Energy Funding, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.re
newableenergyworld.com/articles/2014/03/the-us-department-of-energys-2014-budget
-request-implications-for-renewable-energy-funding.html [https://perma.cc/RA3T-QZRY].
13 BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP, DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION ACT: A SUMMARY 1 (Practising Law Inst., 2010) [hereinafter DODD-FRANK SUMMARY].
14 Barbara C. George et al., The Opaque And Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry:
Victim Or Culprit In The Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 359, 360
(2009) (discussing the role of hedge funds in the 2008 financial crisis).
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In addition to introducing large amounts of capital into the green
sector, evaluating the pre-Dodd-Frank funds will allow the SEC to eval-
uate its hedge fund regulations in real-time. Due to the fact that hedge
funds create concerns for economists and regulators,15 there was an in-
crease in SEC regulation in the Dodd-Frank reform after the Financial
Crisis of 2008.16 However, there are camps of scholars who are not con-
vinced of hedge funds’ role in causing the economic setbacks of 2008.17 If
hedge funds are overregulated, the government is needlessly spending
money to supervise an industry that does not need supervising. This is
the equivalent of having a lifeguard watching a pool full of Olympic swim-
mers; it is redundant and wasteful. In addition, these regulations create
additional tasks for funds, which raise their operational costs,18 and in
turn raise the costs of capital.19 Proving the regulations are necessary with
empirical evidence will quash any theorists pushing for less regulation.
By monitoring a specific and controlled subset of hedge funds that are
operating regulation free, and comparing the results to other hedge funds
operating under Dodd-Frank regulation, the SEC will ascertain that these
specific Dodd-Frank regulations are hindering the financial markets.
Dodd-Frank hedge fund regulation is overbearing and unneces-
sary. Allowing hedge funds that pledge a sustainable energy investment
strategy to return to pre-Dodd-Frank regulation will generate an influx
of capital into sustainable energy firms, thus allowing those firms to
expand and gain market share from traditional fossil fuels, and allow the
SEC to perform a real-time evaluation of the Dodd-Frank hedge fund
regulations. Such real time evaluations are usually not possible given the
nature of regulations, making the proposal even more beneficial. The
first section of this Note will provide a brief background on hedge funds
and Dodd-Frank reform. The second section will discuss the impact that
hedge funds had in the Financial Crisis, and renew arguments for and
against regulation of hedge funds. The third section will outline the his-
tory of funding for the green energy sector, what makes up a “green fund”
and the current state of the traditional energy market. The Conclusion
will outline how funds will apply for this regulatory relief, as well as map
out the potential challenges to this scheme.
15 See COGGAN, supra note 10, at 64–65 (discussing the four major areas of concern for
hedge funds: systematic risk, fraud, tax evasion, and regulatory arbitrage).
16 See DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 3.
17 See George et al., supra note 14.
18 See DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 3.
19 See COGGAN, supra note 10, at 82–83.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. What Is a Hedge Fund?
It is important to start from the beginning by addressing what a
hedge fund is actually comprised of. “Hedge fund” is a term used very
frequently when financial markets are concerned, but it is difficult to
concretely define the elements of these entities. As Philip Coggan of the
Economist described hedge funds, “It is a bit like describing a monster;
no single characteristic is sufficient but you still know one when you see
one.”20 The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) itself does not
have a concrete definition of a hedge fund;21 the SEC did not even at-
tempt to define one in Dodd-Frank,22 except to say that a hedge fund is
an issuer that would be an issuer under the Investment Company Act of
1940 (“1940 Act”) but for the exceptions existing in sections 3(c)(1) and
(7) of the Act.23 This definition is intentionally vague, as the point of
Dodd-Frank was to close this loophole in the 1940 Act.
Hedge funds can be outlined, however, by the following character-
istics: (1) they are usually private pools of capital, i.e., not everyone can
invest in them; (2) they are illiquid investments, i.e., investors cannot
immediately access their investment; (3) until Dodd-Frank reform, they
were largely unregulated in the United States; (4) they are typically
registered in an offshore location like the Cayman Islands; (5) they invest
using complex strategies; (6) they often borrow money from big banks in
the course of investing to enhance returns, a process known as leverag-
ing; and (7) the managers of the funds are rewarded according to the
fund’s performance.24
Hedge funds have evolved over time, along with the regulations
on investment companies in the United States. They were essentially cre-
ated to take advantage of the definition of investment companies in the
1940 Act.25 In order to fully understand the Dodd-Frank hedge fund regu-
lations, it is necessary to briefly review the entirety of securities regula-
tion. The basis of securities regulation in the United States is comprised
20 COGGAN, supra note 10, at 3.
21 Id.
22 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 402, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
23 See DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 14.
24 COGGAN, supra note 10, at 4.
25 Id. at 64.
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of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”), the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“1934 Act”), and the 1940 Act. The 1940 Act defines an investment
company as a company who:
(a) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or
proposes to engage primarily, in the business of
investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(b) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
issuing face-amount certificates of the installment
type, or has been engaged in such business and has
any such certificate outstanding; or
(c) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of
investing, reinvesting, owning, holding, or trading
in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire in-
vestment securities having a value exceeding 40
per centum of the value of such issuer’s total assets
(exclusive of Government securities and cash items)
on an unconsolidated basis.26
At first glance this definition seems to encompass hedge funds, but the
subsequent section of the act carves out specific exceptions. Those excep-
tions are numerous (there are two full sections of exceptions, totaling six
pages of text in the Act).27 The biggest of those exceptions are that com-
panies owned by fewer than 100 people are not considered investment
companies, as well as those comprised of only sophisticated investors.28
The 1940 Act forces any funds that qualify as investment companies to
register with the SEC and disclose their financial condition, investment
objectives, structure, and operations on a regular basis.29
Hedge funds were created to exploit the gaps in the 1940 Act,
which may give the reader the impression that these funds are the problem
child of Wall Street.30 But hedge funds’ origins are not necessarily a bad
26 Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. 112-90 § 3(a)(1) (2012).
27 Investment Company Act of 1940, § 3(b)–(c).
28 Id.; see also COGGAN, supra note 10, at 64 (discussing institutional funds and high
wealth individuals—the idea is that these investors have the knowledge and means to
perform due diligence on their own, and the government is not as worried about fund
managers taking advantage of them).
29 COGGAN, supra note 10, at 3.
30 DOUGLAS CUMMING ET AL., HEDGE FUND STRUCTURE, REGULATION & PERFORMANCE
AROUND THE WORLD 160–61 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013).
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thing. Absent the need to adhere to the SEC regulations, fund managers
could use investment strategies that may present more risk, as well as
investing in illiquid assets (vehicles of investment that cannot readily
pay the fund back its investment).31 This allowed managers to create a
more diversified portfolio for the fund than an investor could achieve on
their own.32 The goal of this diversification is to generate a greater return
than the average investment vehicle; hedge funds typically measure
their success against a benchmark index that measures the performance
of a general portion of the stock market.33 Most managers consider their
funds to perform well when they beat their specified index by three per-
centage points or more.34 The evolution of hedge funds has left the U.S.
marketplace with a large sector of the financial services market that
exists today.35
Before the passing of Dodd-Frank in the United States, a hedge
fund was formed as a limited liability partnership, with the investors as
limited partners and hedge fund managers as general partners.36 A fund’s
limited partners (the investors) are made up of wealthy individuals and
institutional investors.37 Funds are limited to 499 investors, to avoid
registration under the 1940 Act, where each investor has at least $5 million
in assets; due to the required sophistication of investors, funds cannot
advertise or make public offerings.38 General partners (the managers) are
compensated with a mix of fixed fees and performance based fees, usually
1–2% in the form of a fixed fee and 15–20% in the form of performance
fees.39 These fees make sense: they align the interests of the managers
with those of their investors, by only providing a limited fee unless the
fund does well and creates corresponding incentives for those large re-
turns that investors are promised when investing in a hedge fund.40
While the basics of hedge funds have not changed in the wake of the
2008 financial crisis, Dodd-Frank did impose a new set of regulations on
hedge funds.
31 See COGGAN, supra note 10, at 64.
32 Id. at 7–8.
33 Id. at 8.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 7.
36 CUMMING ET AL., supra note 30.
37 Id. at 161.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
660 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:653
B. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
On July 21, 2010, Congress signed into law a regulatory reform
for the financial services industry that covers almost every aspect of
capital markets and requires massive rulemaking: the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.41 The Bernie Madoff Ponzi
scheme scandal that hit the fan amid the 2008 crisis set those regulators,
who were already opposed to hedge funds, on a mission to reform.42 Even
though Madoff did not run a hedge fund, his operation did resemble
something like a hedge fund (and as stated above, because hedge funds
have no clear cut definition it is hard to separate certain investment
vehicles out). But, as Philip Coggan notes in his analysis of hedge funds,
“As one fund manager says: ‘When a fight breaks out in a bar, you don’t
hit the bloke who started it. You hit the nearest bloke you don’t like.’ ”43
So, one of the foremost objectives of Dodd-Frank was to repeal the
“private adviser” clause contained in the updated Section 203(b)(3) of the
1940 Act.44 Dodd-Frank simply states that any fund previously utilizing
the “private advisor exemption” must now register with the SEC and/or
their state’s principal office or place of business, leaving just a few excep-
tions remaining for very small or nuanced funds.45 Now that registration
is necessary, hedge funds have a myriad of new disclosure requirements,
reporting requirements, and information sharing obligations to the SEC.46
In addition, Dodd-Frank limits the ability of insured banks and thrifts
from acquiring or gaining partial ownership in hedge funds and private
equity funds, and changes two key definitions from the 1940 Act with
significant implications.47 The following paragraphs outline these new
burdens in more detail.
Under Dodd-Frank reporting and disclosure, hedge funds must do
the following:
1. Keep any and all records that the SEC deems nec-
essary in the public interest for the protection of
investors.
41 DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 1.
42 COGGAN, supra note 10, at 72.
43 Id. at 81.
44 DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 3.
45 Id. at 3–4.
46 Id. at 5.
47 Id. at 6–7 (describing the limited ability for institutions that act like banks, for ex-
ample, a thrift, to own or sponsor hedge funds under the provisions of the Act).
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2. Prepare and provide for the Financial Stability Over-
sight Council data in order for the FSOC to monitor
systematic risk.
3. Record and retain the total assets under manage-
ment, the fund’s use of leverage, the fund’s risk
exposure to counterparty credit, all positions and
assets held, valuation strategies, trading practices
and any other information that the SEC would
determine necessary for public interest and pro-
tecting investors.48
This seems like a significant amount of information to report because it
is, in fact, a hefty requirement. Not only is this cumbersome for the funds
to perform, but the mere fact of disclosing things like trading strategies
and assets held could inhibit funds from using some of their more lucra-
tive, but complex, strategies.49 These reporting requirements have yet to
be defined by the SEC, and are also subject to change by the SEC as they
see fit.50 This means that the requirements have the potential to become
more cumbersome and costly in the future.
The changes of the definitions of “qualified client” and “accredited
investor” under Dodd-Frank also have implications on fund functionality.
Dodd-Frank outlines the following qualifications for a qualified client:
“$750,000 assets under management and $1.5 million net worth thresh-
olds for determining a client’s status as a ‘qualified client’ to be adjusted
for inflation by the SEC one year after enactment and every five years
thereafter.”51 As for an accredited investor, Dodd-Frank requires the
following: a net worth (or joint net worth with a spouse) of over $1 mil-
lion, not including the value of their primary household.52 This is a higher
threshold than previously required, and the new qualifications limit the
potential pool of investors who are capable of investing in hedge funds.
In addition to the new reporting requirements and limited inves-
tor pool, the Volcker Rule portion of the Act amends the Bank Holding
Company Act (“BHCA”) and limits the participation of banking entities
48 Id. at 5.
49 See CUMMING ET AL., supra note 30, at 162 (discussing the restrictions that increased
regulation puts on hedge funds and the implications of such restrictions).
50 DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 3.
51 Id. at 7.
52 Id. at 7–8.
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in hedge fund management.53 The Volcker Rule defines a banking entity
as “any insured depository institution; any company that controls [such
institutions] or that is treated as a bank holding company; and any af-
filiate or subsidiary of any such entity.”54 Essentially, what this rule does
is limit the ability of a bank to make large bets in their investments in
a hedge fund.55 While it is still possible for banks to do so, the regulatory
reporting requirements in the Volcker Rule make this a more burden-
some process.56 All in all, just as the other requirements within Dodd-
Frank, this additional reporting will increase the costs to both banks and
funds, which in turn will be passed along to the investor (and subse-
quently the market) in the form of more expensive capital.
It is important to remember that implementing a regulatory struc-
ture of this magnitude is no small feat. Title IX of Dodd-Frank sets out the
budget needed to bring this piece of legislation from theory into reality.57
To put in place a regulatory system of this magnitude takes serious capi-
tal investment by the U.S. government, enough capital to make the budget
look like a hedge fund portfolio itself. Specifically, Title IX of Dodd-Frank
set out the following budget proposals for 2011 through 2015:
1. $1,300,000,000 for fiscal year of 2011
2. $1,500,000,000 for fiscal year of 2012
3. $1,750,000,000 for fiscal year of 2013
4. $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year of 2014
5. $2,250,000,000 for fiscal year of 201558
That is a grand total of $8.8 billion over five years, at a time when our
national debt that has just risen to an astonishing value of over $19
trillion.59 Any way to help minimize national spending is clearly in the
best interest of the country, and removing the Dodd-Frank reporting
regulations on hedge funds would certainly help toward that goal.
53 Id. at 12.
54 Id. at 14.
55 See Volcker Rule, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/volcker-rule.asp
[https://perma.cc/RB5N-BG54] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
56 Id. (noting that banks can still make investments into hedge funds, but must meet
reporting and disclosure requirements, and that larger institutions must also implement
programs to comply with these new rules).
57 DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 19.
58 Id.
59 U.S. NATIONAL DEBT CLOCK, http://www.usdebtclock.org [https://perma.cc/Q2UG-4F3G]
(last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
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II. HAMLET ON HEDGE FUNDS: TO REGULATE OR NOT TO REGULATE,
THAT IS THE QUESTION
A. Hedge Funds’ Impact on the 2008 Financial Crisis
Despite what the restrictions on hedge funds in Dodd-Frank might
suggest to the average American, hedge funds most likely deserve little
to no blame in the Financial Crisis of 2008.60 Two major arguments work
in favor of alleviating hedge funds of culpability from the financial woes
of our country.61
First, hedge funds did not create the mortgage-backed securities
that were the epicenter of the financial break down.62 It was the Lehman
Brothers of the world, the large investment banks, that pooled these
mortgages and issued them as securities.63 Hedge funds played no role
in the creation of these financial instruments. Funds may have pur-
chased these faulty products, but they were not the only participants in
this sham, as almost all large market players were trading in mortgage-
backed securities.
Second, as stated above, hedge funds were not the only entities
buying up these faulty products.64 Mutual funds, pension funds, insurance
companies, and many other institutions (such as foreign banks in the
Euro-zone and China) were all culprits of buying these defective securi-
ties, along with hedge funds.65 And as these suspect assets became more
and more engrained into the investing institutions, it set up the dominos
that were one tap from tumbling down and leaving only rubble in our
60 Hossein Nabilou & Alessio M. Pacces, The Hedge Fund Regulation Dilemma: Direct vs.
Indirect Regulation, 6 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 183, 188 (2015), http://scholarship.law
.wm.edu/wmblr/vol6/iss1/6 [https://perma.cc/AH98-5G5E] (discussing the general consensus
that hedge funds were not contributors to the 2008 financial crisis).
61 See generally Photis Lysandrou, The Real Role of Hedge Funds in the Crisis, FINANCIAL
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e83f9c52-6910-11e1-9931-00144feabdc0
.html#axzz3rVFqAfD8 [https://perma.cc/FM4X-SDXQ].
62 Id.; see also The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course, THE ECONOMIST (Sep. 7,
2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are
-still-being-felt-five-years-article [https://perma.cc/TTB3-UME2] (defining mortgage backed
securities as collateral for bundles of overpriced mortgages that failed when the housing
bubble burst and the true value of the securities revealed itself as much lower than they
were priced on the market).
63 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 62.
64 Lysandrou, supra note 61.
65 Id.; see also The Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 62.
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nation’s economy.66 The first domino began rocking uneasily in 2007 as
banks finally started to question viability of these mortgage backed
securities.67 And then, in 2008, the complex chains of debt completely fell
apart.68 The dominos rattled to the ground, as Lehman Brothers (an
investment bank) filed for bankruptcy, and the crippling effect of credit
default swaps hit insurance giant AIG very hard as well.69 The following
chart shows how these large institutions bloated their balance sheets
leading up to the depression in 1933 and the crisis in 2008,70 providing
a good visual to grasp the severity of the situations:
71
66 See The Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 62.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 The Origins of the Financial Crisis, supra note 62.
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On top of this, European countries had racked up huge debt disparities
during the same period.72 This only exacerbated the financial problems
in the United States once trouble hit.73 One entity missing from all of
these causes leading to the financial crisis: hedge funds. They may have
been there, but as players in the market they could not simply abstain.
They were not, however, cited as either cause or creation of the faulty
securities that brought about 2008.
B. Why Hedge Funds Worry Regulators
There are certain aspects of hedge funds that made them an easy
target for blame after the Financial Crisis of 2008. The answer is that
hedge funds have always caused regulators and politicians to worry for
the following fundamental reasons:
1. The potential for systematic risk of hedge funds,
because of their complex, derivative investments
can have impacts on many other institutions.
2. The use of leverage within hedge fund investing
that ties hedge funds to investment banks.
3. The lack of transparency into hedge fund activities
and the potential for fraud.
4. The placement of hedge funds outside the United
States creates a potential for their use as tax havens.
5. The incentives for other institutions (like banks) to
commit “regulatory arbitrage” and classify as hedge
funds to evade their regulations.74
Specifically, the concerns over leveraging and lack of transparency are
the driving force behind the increased regulation arguments.75 However,
those characteristics that bring about the condemnation of hedge funds
also potentially generate the benefits derived from such alternative
investments.76
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See COGGAN, supra note 10, at 64–65.
75 Laszlo Ladi, Hedge Funds: The Case Against Increased Global Regulation in Light of
the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 5 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. R. 99, 100 (2008), http://digital
commons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055&context=ilmr [https://perma.cc
/4XP5-BMHQ].
76 Id. at 104.
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Complex derivative investments are very risky, but they can also
generate extremely high returns on investment.77 That is simply the
nature of high risk investing—the point of hedge funds—for the high net
worth individuals and institutional investors to seek a greater return on
investment (“ROI”) than they would in other, more traditional investment
vehicles. These are sophisticated and intelligent investors who understand
this risk. Leveraged investments, the additional concern, facilitate liquid-
ity in the global market.78 This liquidity creates the ability of capital to flow
in our markets, enabling innovation in the marketplace.79 A decrease in
liquidity will limit the capital available to those emerging businesses, and
for sustainable energy, means that less capital will be available for inno-
vation in products and development for green energy firms.80
Another argument that cuts against both of these worries is that
hedge fund managers want to run a successful business. Managers gener-
ate most of their profits from a performance based fee structure,81 which
means that if the funds do not generate a positive return, their managers
take significant pay cuts. A sophisticated hedge fund that generates true
value in the marketplace takes this risk very seriously,82 and its manag-
ers are hardly the “cowboys” that run fast and loose with other people’s
money that the media sometimes makes them out to be.83 Some of manag-
ers’ risks line up with those of the regulators, and the entire developed
world that want to see stable financial markets: general market risk,
liquidity and leverage risk and ensuring the correct amount of each in a
portfolio, risks of counterparties not paying the hedge fund, and valua-
tion risks of ensuring positions in the fund are valued accurately.84
In response to these risks, prudent managers have developed
methods to test each risk and ensure that their funds will generate the
returns that they and their investors are looking for, called stress tests.85
These managers’ livelihoods are on the line, so there is no reason to
question their motives in performing these tests. Because they are the
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 See generally Liquidity, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/liquidity
.asp [https://perma.cc/7U7F-X2R6] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
80 Id.
81 See CUMMING ET AL., supra note 30, at 161.
82 See COGGAN, supra note 10, at 78.
83 Id. at 67.
84 Id. at 78–79.
85 Id. at 79–80 (discussing the chief risk officer of a hedge fund developing what he called
the “seven pillars of risk assessment” to stress test his hedge fund).
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individuals who have the greatest knowledge of the funds and their risks,
they are best poised to design and perform these stress tests. Forcing them
to conform to an additional, potentially less effective reporting scheme
drives up the costs of running the fund, costs that are then passed on
through the market to the companies that those hedge funds invest in.
For these reasons, regulators do not need to worry about the unknown
factors of hedge funds that have scared them since the 1970s. They should
trust that the managers are the intelligent businessmen and women and
the prudent investors that they were hired to be, and know that their
sophisticated investors will be watching their every move.
C. Economic Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation
Law can use either direct or indirect methods to effect behavioral
change in the industries that our government regulates.86 Direct regula-
tions specify the target industry and put in place immediate measures
to force behavior modification, while indirect regulations put in place mea-
sures that impact the target industry through an intermediary entity.87
In other words, direct regulations force action under threat of repercus-
sions, whereas indirect regulations rely on economic theory to bring about
the desired directives.88 Prior to Dodd-Frank, the United States used a
system of limited, indirect regulations for their hedge funds, these being
limits on the number of investors as well as who may invest, described
in Section I.89 Dodd-Frank’s imposition of reporting requirements and
limitations on how hedge funds can invest their capital (also described
in Section I) are the type of direct regulations that have been shown to
negate the benefits that hedge funds bring to financial markets.90
Not only do direct regulations of hedge funds limit their benefit
to the financial markets, they do little to eliminate the negative exter-
nalities that hedge funds can cause.91 Reporting and disclosure require-
ments do not necessarily or automatically make hedge funds less risky.
Only changes in investing strategies can remedy the risk and uncertainty
of hedge funds, and simply requiring disclosure does not guarantee that
end result.92 These requirements also cut against the very core of hedge
86 Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 60, at 190.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 190–91.
89 Ladi, supra note 75, at 105.
90 Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 60, at 192.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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fund ideals: that their manager’s use unique and complex strategy to
create the high return on investment (“ROI”) expected from investors.
Disclosure, however, could lead to herding and strategy replication by other
hedge fund managers, and even further to pirated strategies used in more
traditional investment vehicles.93 Professor of Law and Finance Alessio
M. Pacces, along with graduate researcher Hossein Nabilou, identify
three overarching, specific reasons that direct regulations are ineffective
for hedge funds, “(1) direct regulation encourages regulatory arbitrage;
(2) it creates legal placebo effects in hedge funds’ counterparties and
investors; and (3) the one-size-fits-all measures typical of direct regula-
tion cannot adequately address the wide diversity and heterogeneity of
hedge funds and their strategies.”94
First, regulatory arbitrage is the practice of exploiting the gaps be-
tween the “economic substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory
treatment, taking advantage of the legal system’s intrinsically limited
ability to attach formal labels that track the economics of transactions
with sufficient precision.”95 Essentially, it is finding the legal loopholes
to save the fund money or generate higher returns. This argument cuts
both ways, as one criticism of hedge funds is that they are a form of arbi-
trage themselves. However, if the funds will continue to arbitrage, then
it is simply the nature of the beast. Implementing costly regulations that
do not fix the problem is not the answer; it merely shifts the problem.
Second, the placebo effect described above will make the real po-
licing body of hedge funds fall complacent in oversight of the funds. The
counterparties of funds, the true “hedge fund police,” will get lethargic
in checking on hedge funds because they believe that the SEC is now
performing this action through the new reporting guidelines.96 Third, the
fact that hedge funds have no easy definition means that there are a wide
variety of structures among different funds, making a one-size-fits-all
reporting requirement near impossible.97 At minimum, a reporting struc-
ture that is both economic and effective is near impossible.98 These two
factors combined foreshadow a frightening situation: a marketplace of
investors who no longer scrutinize their hedge funds, in the belief that
93 Id.
94 Id. at 194.
95 See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW UPLOADS
3 (Mar. 4, 2010), http://www1.law.umn.edu/uploads/3d/sF/3dsFF3ucy5Dc04r-tWv-Xw
/Fleischer-RegulatoryArbitrage-03-08-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/JB3V-5NGS].
96 Nabilou & Pacces, supra note 60, at 201.
97 Id. at 205.
98 Id.
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government regulations are working, while those very government regu-
lations are not effectively controlling the funds.
All of this analysis points to indirect regulations as the most ef-
fective regulation for hedge funds. The most indirect of those regulations
are the original, albeit almost nonexistent, regulations in place pre-Dodd-
Frank. That is the driving force behind this proposed experiment: it will
give real-time, empirical evidence as to whether or not the above analysis
proves true in today’s complex financial markets. As the Conclusion will
describe, it does so in a fairly controlled way, so as to limit any negative
externalities. Therefore, this proposition can end the argument once and
for all as to the proper forms of regulation for hedge funds. At the same
time, it will provide the possibility for an influx of capital into the sustain-
able energy market that sorely needs it. It will allow for these green firms
to capture market share from traditional fossil fuels. This will, in turn,
reduce the nation’s carbon footprint and combat Global Climate Change.
III. WHERE DO GREEN FUNDS COME FROM?
A. A Brief History of Funding Energy
Green energy firms have been getting increased amounts of fund-
ing in recent years.99 However, the funding still pales in comparison to
the capital available in the traditional energy sector. New investments
are all well and good, but the green energy industry is facing a behemoth
of an opponent.
The oil and gas industry, as odd as it sounds, is a traditional staple
of the American way of life, and thus the industry has major impacts on
the United States’ economy. The first oil well in the world was struck in
1859 in Pennsylvania.100 Since that time, the American economy has
relied heavily on oil and gas, a history marred with volatile swings in the
industry due to massive discrepancies between the supply and demand
of oil.101 Due to the nature of the process, an observer can see these boom-
bust cycles occur consistently from the late nineteenth century up until
99 See Eoghan Macguire, Who’s Funding the Green Energy Revolution?, CNN (June 12,
2012, 5:15AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/12/world/renewables-finance-unep/ [https://
perma.cc/M3D5-3LE4] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
100 See Matt Phillips, Let us now give thanks for oil busts, a great American tradition,
QUARTZ (Dec. 11, 2014), http://qz.com/309410/were-about-to-experience-a-great-american
-tradition-the-energy-bust/ [https://perma.cc/6LHL-GTB3] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
101 Id.
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present day.102 Economists and investors continue to believe that a boom
will soon follow the next bust, and oil and gas companies continue to
receive large investments.
The inertia of oil and gas in the United States has led to massive
corporations in the industry: a recent Statista study reported that there
are seven companies globally with market capitalizations of over $100
billion.103 Industry top dog, Exxon Mobil, has a market valuation of an
astonishing $356.5 billion.104 A Bloomberg New Energy Finance White
Paper from 2014 called fossil fuel divestment a $5 trillion challenge, as
that was the value of outstanding stocks in oil and gas firms at the time.105
The same paper estimated a capacity for renewable energy investment at
$257 million for 2015 (not a projection at the actual investment, but rather
the total that could possibly be invested).106 In addition, the WilderHill
New Energy Global Innovation Index, an index that trades clean energy
company stocks, supports a total of 106 green energy firms with a market
capitalization of $220 billion.107 A quick calculation comparing these mar-
ket capitalizations shows that the sustainable energy firms are operating
with about 4% of the capital that oil and gas firms have.
As far as new investment, Dr. Karlheinz Knickel, the head of the
Frankfurt School for Climate and Sustainable Energy Finance, estimates
that $400 billion of new money is poured into fossil fuel technology while
renewables only have $66 billion at their disposal.108 This is due, for the
most part, to the fact that the Green Energy movement only came into
being in the late 1960s,109 and with such a significant head start, it is not
difficult to understand why such a huge discrepancy in the market capi-
talization of the two industries exists.
102 Id.
103 Top 10 oil and gas companies worldwide based on market value in 2015 (in billion U.S.
dollars), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/272709/top-10-oil-and-gas-companies
-worldwide-based-on-market-value/ [https://perma.cc/66PA-C4FT] (last visited Nov. 15,
2016).
104 Id.
105 Nathaniel Bullard, Fossil fuel divestment: a $5 trillion challenge, BLOOMBERG NEW
ENERGY FINANCE (Aug. 26, 2014), http://about.bnef.com/content/uploads/sites/4/2014/08
/BNEF_DOC_2014-08-25-Fossil-Fuel-Divestment.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ7G-C9R4] (last
visited Nov. 15, 2016).
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108 See Macguire, supra note 99.
109 See Sara, A Brief History of the Modern Green Movement in America, WEB ECOIST, http://
webecoist.momtastic.com/2008/08/17/a-brief-history-of-the-modern-green-movement/
[https://perma.cc/M5TK-VGHR] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
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This discrepancy in funding is directly correlated to the actual
amount of power generated from sustainable forms of energy. Clearly,
without the adequate capital to innovate and expand, green energy firms
are unable to compete with traditional forms of energy on a large scale.
The following chart shows just how small a percentage of power is gener-
ated from green energy as opposed to traditional forms across the globe
from 2004 to 2011:
110
As the graph shows, renewable percentage change was moving at
a good rate in 2011, increasing in capacity by 43.7% and actual genera-
tion by 30.7% as a percentage of global capacity and generation change.111
Change is the key word in that statistic—that only compares renewables
today to renewables yesterday. The values above for renewable power as
a percent of total global power generation in 2011 were valued at a
minuscule 6.0%, and the total capacity only at 9.2%.112 This means that
even if the U.S. fully committed to moving from traditional to green
110 Angus McCrone et al., Global Trends in Renewable Energy Investment 2012, FS-UNEP
COLLABORATING CENTRE FOR CLIMATE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FINANCE (June, 2012),
http://fs-unep-centre.org/sites/default/files/attachments/unepglobaltrendschartpack2012
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XS2-K78G].
111 Id.
112 Id.
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energy, that it would not even be possible to supply 10% of the nations
power through renewable sources.
It is easy to see, through this statistical analysis, that the lack of
funding leaves green energy firms at an extreme disadvantage in the
marketplace. Without a substantial investment into the green sector, it
will not have a chance to compete with traditional oil and gas energy.
When it comes to financial markets, David cannot take down Goliath
without a significant capital investment. As Renewable Energy Finance
Project expert Kristy Hamilton stated, “Private financiers aren’t going
to go into renewables unless there is a commercial benefit, particularly
now.”113 One potential solution to this problem is to create incentives for
institutional investors to finance renewable energy firms. Green Energy
Hedge Funds can help close this gap in capital. Allowing regulatory relief
for these types of funds will not only allow green funds to achieve higher
returns, but also incentivize more funds to adopt a strategy of investing
in renewable energy firms.
B. What Makes a Green Fund?
In their book, Energy and Environmental Hedge Funds: The New
Investment Paradigm, Peter Fusaro and Gary Vasey describe green funds
as funds investing in “renewable forms of energy, alternative sources of
energy, and energy efficient technologies.”114 Hedge funds can take many
forms, but the specific strategy of interest for this proposal is the tradi-
tional equity investment in the above detailed Green Funds.115 These are
the types of funds that the SEC should allow to move back to pre-Dodd-
Frank regulations. As hedge funds can have many complex strategies,
not all of these strategies will have a positive impact on the industries that
they invest in (the managers could essentially bet against the industry).116
That result would run counter to this proposal, and therefore only funds
113 See Macguire, supra note 99.
114 See PETER C. FUSARO & GARY M. VASEY, ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL HEDGE FUNDS:
THE NEW INVESTMENT PARADIGM 84 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2011) (discussing the “green”
area of the energy hedge funds).
115 Id. at 121.
116 See generally Hedge Fund: Strategies, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/univer
sity/hedge-fund/strategies.asp [https://perma.cc/3CC2-5BF3] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016);
see also Short Selling, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortselling
.asp [https://perma.cc/GQ9E-AZVP] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (outlining hedge fund strate-
gies, including Short and Relative Arbitrage strategies: selling stocks that managers
believe will decline in value with the intent to buy them back at a discount for profit,
which results in a general depreciation of the shares in that corporation).
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whose strategies are defined as investing in equities of renewable forms
of energy, alternative sources of energy, and energy efficient technologies
would be eligible.
Perhaps the best way to describe a green fund is to give the descrip-
tions found on some current funds’ websites that hold themselves out as
green funds. Earth Capital Partners describes itself as “[a] company spe-
cializing in advising on investments that deliver a commercial risk adjusted
return and addressing the challenges of Sustainable Development such
as climate change, food, energy and water security.”117 The fund breaks
down its focus areas of investment in the sustainable asset management
as renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and clean technology.118
This fund is a perfect model for green funds.
TerraVerde Capital Partners is another bastion of green fund
management. TerraVerde’s team describes their philosophy as: “[T]o
achieve positive absolute returns and reduce portfolio volatility regard-
less of market direction through investments in the infrastructure and
green hedge fund sector including clean tech, renewable energy, and water
and power generation, transmission, and transportation.”119 To generate
this type of return in a volatile market, TerraVerde employs skilled port-
folio managers with a global focus who focus on the “paradigm shift of
energy and power changes in. . . renewable energy markets.”120 So why
would intelligent portfolio managers at hedge funds continue to invest in
oil and gas? It is due to the deep integration of traditional energy into our
society, as well as the “oil cycles” discussed above.121 Experts will esti-
mate that the oil cycle has bottomed out, even when the market outlook
is not good, which will lead to massive investments back into oil and gas
companies.122 The section below will go further into the current market
outlook, however, it is important to note this here because managers like
those at TerraVerde are more forward thinking than most. TerraVerde
117 Our Business, EARTH CAPITAL PARTNERS LLP, http://www.earthcp.com/our-business
[https://perma.cc/CVC3-SVFU] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
118 Investment Focus, EARTH CAPITAL PARTNERS LLP, http://www.earthcp.com/investment
-focus [https://perma.cc/NYQ5-FQNY] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
119 Our Portfolio Objective With Infrastructure & Green Investments, TERRAVERDE CAPI-
TAL PARTNERS, http://terraverdecap.com/about-us/our-portfolio-objective [https://perma
.cc/K6B5-7ZPY] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
120 Id.
121 See Phillips, supra note 100.
122 Ky Trang Ho, Why Two Wall Street Giants Recommend Investors Buy Oil and Gas
Now, FORBES (Apr. 24, 2015, 10:01 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/trangho/2015/04/24
/why-two-wall-street-giants-recommend-investors-buy-oil-and-gas-now/#23562b912917
[https://perma.cc/VHA5-H6U7].
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believes the best opportunity to achieve long-term growth is to invest
ahead of the curve on the sustainable energy market.123 Management
takes their strategy into account when selecting new managers, and
oversees them constantly to ensure they maintain their integrity to their
mission statement.124
Earth Capital and TerraVerde provide the template for what a
green fund should look like. The SEC should set out qualifying standards
for green funds based on these two firms. Long-strategy equity investment
portfolios that invest in renewable energy, sustainable agriculture, clean
technology, climate change mitigation, and food and water sustainability
should qualify. Firms would apply for an exemptive application,125 and the
SEC would review the application against this criteria. The SEC would
then allow all firms that pass their judgment as green firms to operate in
the pre-Dodd-Frank standards of reporting for hedge funds. This operation
would take place at the time of filing for new funds, or upon an exemptive
application by an existing fund (like Earth Capital or TerraVerde).
C. The Current Energy Market and Future Green Potential
It is no secret that the U.S. financial markets are in a state of
disarray.126 The current slide has been attributed to the economic woes
in China,127 in addition to the glut of oil supply that is hurting the energy
sector.128 Due to this massive oil supply, demand has slowed and driven
123 Sustainability, TERRAVERDE CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://terraverdecap.com/sustainability
[https://perma.cc/29ZX-5ALV] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
124 Infrastructure and Green Investments, TERRAVERDE CAPITAL PARTNERS, http://terraverde
cap.com/about-us/our-company [https://perma.cc/X3GM-C3ZL] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
125 See 40 Act Exemptive Applications, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 29, 1996), https://www
.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/230fin.htm [https://perma.cc/3AFA-3P92] (outlining an applica-
tion to exempt a person, security, or transaction from a rule under the Securities Acts or
SEC rules).
126 See generally Stock Market and Financial Markets Overview, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS,
http://www.bloomberg.com/markets/world [https://perma.cc/9D7V-MGYP] (last visited
Nov. 15, 2016) (stating statistical data for financial markets, with the Dow Jones, S&P
500, and NASDAQ indices down 7.60%, 6.18%, and 6.08% respectively over the past 12
months as of March 2, 2016).
127 See Simon Denyer & Renae Merle, U.S., world stock markets slide as panic in China
spreads, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-stocks
-plunge-7-percent-triggering-another-market-closure/2016/01/07/d6a83bf5-10b2-4289-8aab
-98e485a3fe6e_story.html [https://perma.cc/J4U3-SCEG] (describing the weak economy,
overvalued currency, and lack of investor confidence that has caused Chinese markets
to plummet in 2016).
128 See Patti Domm, This is why oil glut not going away soon, CNBC (Jan. 27, 2016),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/27/this-is-why-oil-glut-not-going-away-soon.html [https://
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the price down to levels that have not been seen since 2003.129 To give some
context, that was the same time when 50 Cent’s ‘In Da Club’ was topping
the music charts and the statue of Saddam Hussein was falling in Iraq.130
In fact, the price of a barrel of oil and the U.S. stock markets have been
moving in almost identical trends during the turbulent start to 2016.131
Over the first twenty days of January 2016, the correlation between price
moves in the Brent (crude futures, a global benchmark for oil prices) and
the S&P 500 Index (U.S. Stock Exchange) were at a staggering 0.95 (a
value of one would mean that the two benchmarks were moving in ex-
actly the same trend).132 This value is astounding, and the correlation is
higher than any calendar month that it has been calculated for, except
for two months in 1990.133 In fact, the correlation is around 0.15 higher
than the value when it spiked to above 0.8 during the Financial Crisis of
2008.134 Clearly there is something amiss with the U.S. economy, and the
traditional energy sector is a major factor in the nation’s fiscal distress.
Oil and gas companies are suffering financially from this supply
predicament.135 A Wall Street Journal article on the subject, citing a
Wolfe Research study, stated, “As many as a third of American oil-and-
gas producers could tip toward bankruptcy and restructuring by mid-
2017. . . .”136 This third of oil companies will encompass the smaller firms
in the market, who took on large amounts of debt to finance drilling op-
erations in the U.S. during the drilling boom, and now owe in excess of
$13 billion.137 It is not just the small player oil companies that are taking
a hit, though. Chevron posted a fourth quarter 2015 loss of over $500
million, its first quarterly loss since 2002.138 The U.S.’s second largest
perma.cc/G6E2-MGSA] (describing the continued stockpiling of oil in the U.S. that is
keeping oil around $30 a barrel and limiting the U.S. economy).
129 Nicole Friedman, Oil Skids to 12-Year Low, WALL ST. J., Jan. 12, 2016, at C1.
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WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2016, at C1.
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135 Another Steep Drop in Oil and Natural Gas Prices Is Pulling the Stock Market Lower
in Early Trading, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles
/2016-02-01/asian-stocks-uneven-as-china-data-japan-policy-weighed [https://perma.cc
/4LUG-MHZ8] (explaining a steep drop in oil and natural gas company stock prices).
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138 Bradley Olson & Erin Ailworth, Chevron Posts Loss, Readies More Layoffs, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 30–31, 2016, at B3.
676 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 41:653
energy company by revenue (Chevron) is also setting up a second wave
of layoffs of around 4,000 employees in 2016 (after letting go 3,200
workers in 2015) and cutting its capital spending by $9 billion.139 Big and
small energy firms alike are suffering heavily, that much we know, but
the question that remains is how will investors respond to the current
market setting?
Above, Section III.A discussed the history of the energy sector in
the U.S., and in particular the oil cycle that has been entrenched in our
country’s energy history.140 The basic idea behind this cycle is that the
processes by which companies extract oil from the ground cause large
swings in the supply, and thus the demand, of oil and gas.141 This idea
can tempt investors to replenish their bets on traditional energy, even
when the market is suffering such large losses. There are certainly ex-
perts who are making the case for such a bet, saying that investors can
re-enter the traditional energy market while oil prices and oil company
stock prices are bottomed out, and ride the upswing to large profits.142
Ironically, this particular expert made this suggestion in August of 2015,
when prices had just fallen below $50 per barrel.143 Through January
2016 the price of a barrel of oil fell all the way through to the $27 range,144
and analysts at the major investment banks like Morgan Stanley and
Goldman Sachs estimate that the Chinese economic downturn could keep
prices in the $20 range.145 Betting on traditional energy last August, then,
would have resulted in massive losses. The point here is that, while oil
has always had a cycle, we also now know that oil is a finite resource.146
Estimates as to the ultimate supply of oil on earth are always rough, but
the U.S. Energy Information Administration (“EIA,” a relatively unbi-
ased party) estimated in 2014 that the global supply of oil would be ade-
quate to satisfy human demand until 2039.147 Investors might need a bit
139 Id.
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142 See Claire Poole, 22 Oil and Gas Stocks to Buy as Oil Prices Bottom Out, THESTREET
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of a push in order to break the oil cycle, but doing so could save them
huge dollar amounts in the long run.
The regulatory break from Dodd-Frank for green funds is the
perfect push. Private equity investors are already apportioning $100
billion to pick apart the remains of the failing small-oil-producing firms
mentioned above.148 But oil has a limited time span; for arguments sake
let us assume that the supply ends in 23 years as suggested in the EIA
study.149 At that point in time, renewable and clean energy sources will
not only have potential to capture market share in the energy market,
they may provide the only viable source of energy for our society. Private
equity managers are poised to start investing heavily into broader and
newer investments at the start of 2016,150 and private equity and hedge
funds typically have similar investing strategies.151 Twenty-three years
may seem like a long time to the lay investor, but to private equity
investors, or long positioned equity hedge fund managers, the time frame
is not quite as prolonged. The current market structure and opportunity
in the sustainable energy sector is a great selling point to hedge fund
managers. It would promote participation by hedge funds in this regula-
tory scheme, pouring more money into the renewable energy sector.
CONCLUSION: GREEN FUND REGULATION EXEMPTIVE RELIEF
A. Proposed Regulatory System
The proposed regulatory system is a rather simple fix, in theory.
Any new hedge fund, when registering under the Securities Act of 1933
and the 1940 Act, would have the opportunity to apply for exemptive
relief to take advantage of the “Green Fund Reporting Structure.” As
stated above in Section III, exemptive applications allow 1940 Act regis-
tered companies to apply for “exemptive relief,” or an authorization from
the SEC to permit a person or company to operate outside of the scope of
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the Act.152 Exemptive relief is not an underhanded move on the part of
investment companies, for example exemptive relief is used in practice
today to create novel investment vehicles like money market funds.153
These actions are done through the SEC, undergo careful scrutiny, and
are in the best interest of investment companies and their investors.
Grants of exemptive relief are simply a way to update a very old legal
structure without cumbersome political restructuring. In an industry
that is almost constantly growing and changing, exemptive relief is a far
superior option to completely overhauling the system.154
The application would contain a basis for the relief requested,
identify the benefits to investors and any conditions that protect inves-
tors.155 This is a standard procedure for all exemptive relief,156 and the
SEC can standardize the application to make the process easier for green
funds to apply (using, among other things, the information contained in
this article). The same body that reviews all exemptive relief applications
(the Office of Investment Company Regulation or OICR) would then re-
view the information provided, with the opportunity to ask the applying
party for clarifications or modifications.157 Once that review is complete
and to the satisfaction of the OICR, exemptive relief is granted.158 When
relief is granted, a filing is made with the SEC; in the case of green funds,
the SEC would need to add a new filing category.159 If the petition is
denied, a post is generated in the Federal Register and the applying party
has a chance for a hearing to appeal the decision.160 This is a process that
the SEC has outlined and practiced for many years, making it relatively
easy for the SEC to integrate new exemptive relief for green funds.161
Pre-existing funds that identify their strategies as a green fund
would apply for exemptive relief in the same process.162 As these funds
are already in operation, the only substantive difference is that they will
have the rest of their necessary forms already on file with the SEC. In
152 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 125.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 125.
159 Investment Company Act Notices and Orders Category Listing, SEC, https://www.sec
.gov/rules/icreleases.shtml [https://perma.cc/EH7N-ASQW] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
160 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 125.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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practice, these funds will have an easier application process, as the SEC
can view past investments and performance of the fund for a quick cursory
check on whether or not they fall into the definition of a green fund. In
addition, to check on the system as a whole and reevaluate the Dodd-
Frank regulations for hedge funds, the SEC would have to perform an
evaluation on the funds that have been operating under the exemptive
relief at the one year and five year marks from the time when the system
is first put into place.163 All funds would have to submit any additional
financial statements that the SEC requested at that time to ensure the
exemptive relief was not abused, as well as give the SEC insight into
whether or not to allow more or all hedge funds to operate under the same
regulatory structure.164
B. Addressing Potential Concerns
Despite their many benefits, hedge funds are investment vehicles
that come along with a certain amount of risk involved.165 The general
market risk, risk of leveraging and the risks of improper valuation of the
funds are not exclusive to hedge funds, but are apparent in some way in
any financial investment vehicle.166 Admittedly, these risks are amplified
due to the nature of hedge funds. Consequentially, one potential concern
is if some maverick hedge fund managers are allowed to skirt the new
rules, they will run afoul with their funds to the detriment of their in-
vestors and the market as a whole.167 One response to this worry is that,
as discussed above, hedge fund investors are sophisticated and capable
of performing some due diligence on their own to safeguard their invest-
ments.168 The securities laws (the 1933 Act, 1934 Act, and 1940 Act) were
enacted to protect the general investing public.169 The government is
worried about the average investor not having access to enough informa-
tion to make an informed decision about which securities to buy.170 But
163 See DODD-FRANK SUMMARY, supra note 13, at 7.
164 Id. at 63.
165 See COGGAN, supra note 10, at 67, 78–79.
166 What are some examples of risks associated with financial markets?, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/050515/what-are-some-examples-risks
-associated-financial-markets.asp [https://perma.cc/B94A-RQRJ] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016)
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with the limitations on hedge funds restricting their membership to only
high net worth and entities well-versed in investing, the worries that
prompted this entire framework of law are no longer present. The need
is not there, and therefore any extra costs are superfluous and hurt the
nation’s economy.
As for the markets as a whole, the one and five-year audits of the
system as a whole would safeguard against abuse. In these audits, which
would be necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the Dodd-Frank
regulations on hedge funds, the SEC would also be able to ascertain if
any fraud or other malfeasance took place under the exemptive relief.
With both the concerns about investors and the overall economy miti-
gated by these two factors, the regulatory structure as a whole should not
worry the general investing public.
Another worry could be that the hedge fund managers will not
bite, and this entire scheme will be a waste of time and money. However,
the current stressed state of the financial markets in the United States
warrants a change in any investment strategy. Our current economic
woes are due to the dependency of the U.S. on the traditional energy
sector.171 At a certain point the supply of traditional forms of energy will
expire, and hedge fund managers (and all other investors) will need to
move their money in another direction.172 Moving forward now will allow
hedge fund managers to ride investment returns ahead of the curve and
win big on green energy. In addition, the simple fact that the new regula-
tory and reporting structure for hedge funds under Dodd-Frank is very
costly to hedge funds173 should at least attract some funds with ambitious
managers who are confident in their investing abilities and looking to cut
costs in a competitive market.
Recall that hedge funds are complex investment vehicles, which
give them the reputation as the “bad boys” of Wall Street.174 This caused
the Dodd-Frank reform to target hedge funds in their new regulations and
increase reporting and disclosure requirements for funds.175 However,
hedge funds were not a significant cause of the Financial Crisis of 2008
that prompted the Dodd-Frank reform in the first place.176 Even though
the configuration of hedge funds worry regulators, indirect regulations
171 See supra Section III.C.
172 Id.
173 See CUMMING ET AL., supra note 30, at 162 (discussing the restrictions that increased
regulation puts on hedge funds and the implications of such restrictions).
174 See supra Section I.A.
175 See supra Section II.B.
176 See supra Section II.A.
2017] A “GREEN” APPROACH TO HEDGE FUND REGULATION 681
are actually more effective at controlling these entities than direct regu-
lations.177 For these reasons, the SEC should not worry about imposing
direct requirements on hedge funds. This calls for a reform of the hedge
fund regulations imposed in Dodd-Frank. Combined with the sagging
traditional energy sector of the market,178 there is no worry that a plan
for exemptive relief for green funds will garner participation from hedge
fund managers.
C. The Outcomes: Win-Win or No-Lose
Hedge fund regulations under Dodd-Frank are unnecessarily
stringent. The market as a whole, hedge funds, corporations, and inves-
tors, would benefit from cheaper capital if the regulations were moved
back to pre-Dodd-Frank standards. In order to test this theory, the SEC
should allow a subset of hedge funds to operate on pre-Dodd-Frank stan-
dards while forcing the remaining funds to operate under the current
reporting regime. To support the need for greater capital influx into the
renewable energy sector of the U.S. economy, the SEC should only allow
those funds that apply for exemptive relief as “green funds” to make up
the subset that operates under pre-Dodd-Frank standards. The SEC would
then evaluate both sets of funds at one-year and five-year intervals out
from the inception of the program, and determine whether or not the
Dodd-Frank hedge fund regulations are necessary and working correctly.
The proposed scheme has two possible outcomes. For simplicities
sake, we will label them the “Win-Win” outcome and the “No-Lose” out-
come. If this theory is correct, the result is the Win-Win outcome. The
logic of this outcome is as follows: if the regulations are, in fact, overly
stringent and simply adding extra costs to hedge fund operations, then
allowing green funds to operate at pre-Dodd-Frank standards will allow
an influx of cheap capital into the sustainable energy market. This will
allow sustainable energy firms to capture much needed market share
from traditional oil and gas firms, which have always dominated the U.S.
market. This will allow for innovation in research and development in
sustainable energy firms, making it much more likely that clean energy
alternatives will become viable choices for the American public. In turn,
as citizens have more and more options for clean fuel, the U.S. will be able
to use less and less fossil fuels that contribute to Global Climate Change,
177 See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
178 See supra Conclusion.B.
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reducing the individual and national carbon footprint.179 In the process of
this movement toward a “green” America, the SEC will be able to evaluate
its Dodd-Frank hedge fund regulations, and be able to modify the regula-
tory structure to optimize regulation and investing goals. This will reduce
costs for the SEC and increase capital flow in the marketplace. A more
sustainable country and a reduced cost to the SEC would be a win-win.
There is, of course, the possibility that the theory in this Note will
not play out as described. Even if that happens, the proposal is still a
worthwhile exercise for the SEC. If the Dodd-Frank hedge fund regula-
tions are, in fact, necessary and working to actively protect the markets
and the investing public, this experiment will prove that. Green funds
could run into some foul play—which would be caught quickly by the
SEC in their yearly review or by hedge fund investors doing their due
diligence—and the SEC would know that the new regulations are neces-
sary. Or, in the alternative, green funds could act perfectly lawfully but
still perform on par with all other hedge funds. If either of these scenarios
plays out, the SEC will be able to point to a tangible study that affirms
their new regulatory structure. This is something that is rarely attain-
able for a new regulatory structure, and would put to rest any arguments
from Wall Street activists who continue to fight the new regulations. No
harm, no foul, the “No-Lose” scenario still gives the SEC valuable infor-
mation. Either way, this is a worthy regulatory experiment that could re-
sult in massive development in sustainable energy in the United States.
The need for a reduction in our national carbon footprint to combat cli-
mate change is so poignant that the nation should consider any possible
solution, even obscure hedge fund reform, if it will help push toward a
more sustainable world.
179 See What’s My Carbon Footprint?, NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/green
living/carboncalculator/ [https://perma.cc/4W69-9YTN] (last visited Nov. 15, 2016) (de-
scribing the greenhouse gas emissions that individuals use on a daily basis that contribute
to climate change).
